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AGAINST THE “NETWORKED 
INFORMATION ECONOMY”: RETHINKING 
DECENTRALIZATION, COMMUNITY, AND 
FREE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
Ben Roberts
The free, libre, and open source software (FLOSS) movement is often 
cited as an example of fundamental changes in production associated 
with the rise of information networks. Don Tapscott and Anthony D. 
Williams see it as an example of wikinomics, a powerful new form of eco-
nomic production based on sharing and self-organization.1 Yochai Benk-
ler argues that the form of social or peer production evident in FLOSS 
can compete with or even displace traditional forms of capitalist organi-
zation and sees it as a symptom of the “networked information economy,” 
replacing the “industrial information economy,” which has been in force 
since the late-nineteenth century.2 The main feature of this networked 
information economy is the much greater role within it for decentralized 
individual action.3
This essay contests this broadly liberal take on the significance of the 
free software movement. It argues that Benkler is typical of an approach 
that tends to view the Internet as the primary enabler of decentraliza-
tion (for example, in the form of decentralized software development). Of 
course, it would be foolish to discount the role that networks have played 
in the success of FLOSS. But, as I will argue, an examination of its history 
suggests that its origins can’t be entirely accounted for in purely techno-
logical and economic grounds. The proponents of such an approach often 
resist the claim that their focus on networks is technologically determin-
ist,4 arguing that the network itself is shaped by social and cultural factors. 
However, this makes the explanatory power of networks rather circular: 
the existence of networks explains social and cultural behavior at the same 
time as being explained by it. The explanation of free software in terms 
of the economic properties of networks is simply too static and asocial; it 
serves to explain how a particular mode of production can functionally 
compete with the market without really being able to account for how this 
change has come about. In particular, as I will show, the marginalization 
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of the question of labor in theories of peer production disconnects the 
analysis from wider changes in the nature of economic production. More-
over, the emphasis on the empowerment of individuals ignores the pos-
sibility that decentralization consists in radical new forms of sociality and 
collectivity, something that can perhaps be seen in the communities built 
around particular free software projects. As I will argue, Gilbert Simon-
don’s concept of individuation may help inform a better understanding of 
the emergence of such free software communities.
From the perspective of a nonprogrammer, it is easiest to understand 
the concept of FLOSS by explaining how proprietary software such as 
Microsoft Windows is distributed. The operating system and applications 
that users run on their personal computers (PCs) are most often compiled 
software. The creators of the application have written the code in any one 
of a number of different human-readable programming languages; this 
program is known as the source code. The source code is then converted 
by another program known as a compiler into object or binary code, which 
is a machine-readable version of the program executed when the applica-
tion is run on a PC. Binary, or object, code is the form in which software is 
most often distributed to users, either on installation media such as com-
pact discs (CDs), installed on a computing device before sale or, increas-
ingly, downloaded over the Net. The end user of proprietary software 
created and distributed in this fashion has no access to the original source 
code and is therefore unable to alter, change, or fix the software running 
on their machine: in the words of Bob Young, the former chief execu-
tive officer (CEO) of open source software company Red Hat, purchasing 
proprietary software is like buying a “car with the hood welded shut.”5
In addition to the absence of source code, proprietary software is usu-
ally distributed under the terms of a highly restrictive software license. In 
effect, the applications run by a user remain the property of the software 
maker and may be used only under the terms of this contract. Typically, 
the license prevents sharing or redistribution of the software and any 
form of tampering or reverse engineering: that is, taking the product apart 
in order to discover how it has been made. Companies such as Microsoft 
therefore not only own the means of production of software but also exert 
a tight and perhaps unprecedented degree of control over the distribution 
and consumption of their products.
Software created and distributed under a FLOSS license, on the other 
hand, guarantees users access to the source code and therefore the ability 
to modify the programs they use. In addition, the license grants users free-
dom to copy and redistribute the software. So-called copyleft licenses, such 
as the GNU (GNU’s Not Unix) Public License (GPL),6 make a further 
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stipulation requiring that modifications to the software, if redistributed, 
must also be made available under the same license. In effect, they re-
quire programmers modifying the original code to make their changes 
available to the community. As Steven Weber puts it, “[T]he GPL uses 
copyright law to ensure that free software and derivative works from free 
software remain free.”7
These licenses legislate two radically different approaches to the pro-
duction of software. On the one hand, proprietary software is usually 
manufactured by a single company that derives an income—and pay 
programmers—from the proceeds of license sales. On the other hand, 
in the FLOSS approach, software is created by a community consisting 
of a mixture of unwaged volunteers and paid programmers; these lat-
ter employees often work for multiple (and competing) companies, and 
their wages are usually paid for through the proceeds of a related product 
(support or some other kind of service) rather than through license sales. 
Proprietary software is a paid-for product, manufactured by private com-
panies, that is made and marketed like any other commodity. FLOSS is 
distributed for free and often produced by a disparate, distributed collec-
tion of developers.
Given the dominance of what Mark Fisher has called “capitalist real-
ism,” one might find it surprising that a collective form of production 
with property held in common—one that the former Microsoft CEO Bill 
Gates has described as “communism”—could compete with the more 
recognizable form of capitalist production represented by the proprietary 
model.8 Yet free software has been extraordinarily successful. In April 
2010, a survey by the network monitoring firm Netcraft estimated that the 
open source Web server Apache was being used by over half of all active 
websites on the network.9 The operating system Linux is used to operate 
the networks of some of the biggest companies on the Web, including 
Google and Amazon. Yet perhaps even more surprising is the sheer scale 
of the software currently emerging from FLOSS projects. Software lines 
of code (SLOC) is used to gauge the size of software projects based on the 
number of lines of source code written by their programmers. SLOC can 
be used to estimate the amount of labor time that has gone into a particular 
application. Debian GNU/Linux is a community-produced distribution 
of the Linux operating system. (Distribution here means that Debian con-
sists not only of the core operating system [or kernel] but also of the wide 
range of applications that can be run on top of the Linux system [e.g. Web 
browsers, office software, and server applications], which can be freely 
installed from Debian’s large software repository.) Researchers at King 
Juan Carlos University in Madrid have used automated line-counting 
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tools to generate line counts for programs in Debian’s software repository. 
These figures give some indication of how much labor is currently being 
expended in FLOSS endeavors (table 1).
From this table we can see that the amount of software in Debian’s 
repositories has grown by a factor of over 10 in the last ten years and that 
increase in code is equivalent to about 110 thousand person-years of com-
bined programmer effort; had all that labor been paid for by companies, 
it would have cost, on these estimates, over $300 billion. Clearly, both the 
success and the productivity of open source poses a number of puzzles 
for the perspective of “capitalist realism.” How is collective and collab-
orative labor of the kind that goes on in FLOSS able to compete with, 
and in many cases prevail over, the competitive rigor of labor organized 
by the market? How is it that competing software companies now find 
themselves sharing code contributions with one another? What are we 
to make of the profitable businesses that have been built on top of largely 
unpaid labor?
Over the past ten years, a response has emerged in the work of writers 
such as Yochai Benkler, Don Tapscott, and Anthony D. Williams. These 
writers see the success of FLOSS as essentially bound to the arrival of 
low-cost distributed communications networks. They downplay the so-
cial and political aspects of free software in favor of an analysis of the 
functional and business advantages of shared intellectual property and 
mass collaboration (or what Benkler calls peer production). Their ap-
proach is therefore in stark contrast with writers, such as David M. Berry, 
who see in free software new forms of political imaginary or, as he puts it, 
the promise of “a form of collective decision-making through a democra-
tization of technology.”11
In effect this argument echoes one that is at the heart of the FLOSS 
movement between the proponents of free software and those of open 
source. This dispute is often encapsulated in terms of the respective posi-
tions of two important figures within the evolution of FLOSS: Richard 
Stallman and Eric Raymond. Stallman, founder of the Free Software 
Foundation, is often seen as espousing an ethical approach to what he 
prefers to call free software. As Chris DiBona, Sam Ockman, and Mark 
Stone put it,
Stallman launched the GNU project because essentially he 
feels that the knowledge that constitutes a running pro-
gram—what the computer industry calls the source code—
should be free. If it were not, Stallman reasons, a very few, 
very powerful people would dominate computing. Where 
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proprietary commercial software vendors saw an indus-
try guarding trade secrets that must be tightly protected, 
Stallman saw scientific knowledge that must be shared and 
distributed.12
Raymond, on the other hand, emphasizes the practical benefits of shar-
ing source code. Along with Bruce Perens, he founded the Open Source 
Initiative (OSI) in 1998, which promotes a more business-friendly ap-
proach to FLOSS. In his seminal essay “The Cathedral and the Bazaar,” 
Raymond contrasts the centralized cathedral approach to software devel-
opment usually found until then in the software industry with what he 
terms the distributed bazaar style of programming, which he believes to 
characterize FLOSS programming and, in particular, the evolution of the 
Linux operating system.13 Raymond relates his early experience of Linux 
as follows:
Linux overturned much of what I thought I knew. . . . 
[T]he Linux community seemed to resemble a great bab-
bling bazaar of differing agendas and approaches . . . out 
of which a coherent and stable system could seemingly 
emerge only by a succession of miracles. The fact that this 
bazaar style seemed to work, and work well, came as a dis-
tinct shock. . . . [T]he Linux world not only didn’t fly apart 
in confusion but seemed to go from strength to strength at 
a speed barely imaginable to cathedral-builders [i.e., tradi-
tional software developers].14
As is clear from Raymond’s opening remarks, “The Cathedral and the 
Bazaar” describes open source as a software development practice rather 
than extolling the beliefs and commitment to freedom so important to the 
Free Software Foundation. Instead of posing the question, “Why should 
software development be free?” it asks, “Why does open source work? 
What make it successful?”15 Raymond’s essay has been highly influen-
tial both inside and outside the software world. It is widely credited, for 
example, with influencing Netscape’s decision to open the source of its 
Web browser, code that eventually became the Firefox Web browser. But 
equally his essentially pragmatic approach to FLOSS advocacy seems to 
have influenced academic discussion of the phenomenon in legal and 
communication studies, an influence that can be seen at work in the ar-
guments of scholars such as Lawrence Lessig and, as I will show here, 
Yochai Benkler.
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Benkler’s approach can perhaps be best seen in his 2002 article “ Coase’s 
Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm.”16 Benkler’s aim from the 
outset is to analyze free software in terms of the wider phenomenon that 
he refers to as “commons-based peer production.” Therefore he opens by 
acknowledging that he is not interested in the cultural specificity of free 
software:
Rather than trying to explain what is special about soft-
ware or hackers, I generalize from the phenomenon of free 
software to suggest characteristics that make large-scale 
collaborations in many information production fields sus-
tainable and productive in the digitally networked envi-
ronment without reliance either on markets or managerial 
hierarchy.17
Benkler’s move here is typical in that it seeks to understand free soft-
ware in terms of a wider phenomenon associated with distributed com-
munications networks. Indeed, most of the examples in his article are 
drawn from outside the software world: Wikipedia, NASA Clickworkers, 
and Web communities such as Slashdot and Kuro5hin.18 The common 
ground, or perhaps commons ground, in these examples is that in each 
case communities are engaged in a collaborative production of knowl-
edge. In essence Benkler seeks to outline an economic rationale for this 
phenomenon. His account draws in no small part on Ronald Coase’s ar-
guments about organizational structure in the well-known article “The 
Nature of the Firm.”19 Coase’s is a classic explanation for the existence of 
firms, companies, or corporations in market economies. We are, perhaps, 
so used to associating private companies and corporations with capitalist 
economies that it might seem rather counterintuitive to see their coexis-
tence as problematic. Yet although companies can be seen as competing in 
free markets, within their own organization they are classically organized 
in the hierarchical control structures associated with Soviet-style com-
mand economies. The puzzle, then, is why, if the pricing model provided 
by markets is so efficient, do individuals come together in the form of 
companies rather than simply trading their labor on the free market? Or 
as Coase puts it, the question is “why organizations such as firms exist in 
a specialized exchange economy in which it is generally assumed that the 
distribution of resources is ‘organized’ by the price mechanism.”20 The 
answer that Coase provides is that there is an overhead to operating on the 
open market, transaction costs associated with the discovery of prices and 
the implementation of contracts. This means that on some occasions it 
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may be cheaper to organize a given transaction with the firm rather than 
on the open market: “[T]he operation of a market costs something and[,] 
by forming an organization and allowing some authority (an ‘entrepre-
neur’) to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are saved.”21 So, 
essentially, capitalist economies are characterized for Coase by two meth-
ods of organization: firm-organized production and market- organized 
production.
The crucial insight of applicability to free software here is that firms 
and markets are not always the cheapest ways of organizing production. 
Benkler argues that we should treat both firms and markets as “mecha-
nisms by which individual agents reduce uncertainty as to the likely value 
of various courses of productive action.”22 This leads him to hypothesize 
that under certain circumstances a third mode of organization, peer pro-
duction, may be able to supplant both the market and the firm. As Benk-
ler puts it, “[W]hen the cost of organizing an activity on a peered basis 
is lower than the cost of using the market or hierarchical organization, 
then peer production will emerge.”23 The conditions of this emergence 
are essentially fourfold and tied to the emergence of what he calls the 
networked information economy: Firstly, information as an object of pro-
duction is nonrivalous, meaning that its availability to one person does not 
impact its availability to another (unlike, say, a house or a car). Secondly, 
cheap computing power means that capital costs of production are low. 
Thirdly, the creative labor involved is highly differentiated and the indi-
viduals involved have a more sophisticated understanding of what they 
can contribute to a given project than either a hierarchical organization 
or market could take account of or master. Fourthly, low communica-
tions costs allow much easier coordination of productive efforts. Benkler 
is hardly alone in arguing that the Internet has lowered transaction costs, 
making it easier to organized production outside the firm. Indeed, we can 
find this view enthusiastically endorsed by Tapscott and Williams:
[T]he Internet has caused transaction costs to plunge so 
steeply that it has become much more useful to read Coase’s 
law, in effect, backward: Nowadays firms should shrink 
until the cost of performing a transaction internally no lon-
ger exceeds the cost of performing it externally.24
There are a number of weaknesses in this argument as an account of 
the free software movement, questions that I address later in this essay. 
However, I want to focus first on the dominant aspect of this approach, 
which ties the emergence of new forms of organizing production to the 
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availability of low-cost network communications. This is the argument 
that Benkler develops in The Wealth of Networks, which argues for the 
emergence of a new form of information economy, a networked informa-
tion economy replacing the industrial information economy that has been 
in force since the late-nineteenth century.25 The primary feature of this 
networked information economy is the much greater role within it for de-
centralized individual action. This empowerment of individuals is the re-
sult of two key changes in the new networked information economy. The 
first is a dramatic reduction in or, as Benkler has it, the “practical elimi-
nation of,” communication costs. The second is a change in the topology 
of information networks from the hub-and-spoke model of mass media 
to a “distributed architecture” with “multidirectional connections.”26 To-
gether these changes enable a new, more democratic and participative, 
form of political communication that Benkler calls the “networked pub-
lic sphere.” In his depiction of these changes, Benkler is, of course, not 
alone—arguments about their potential to transform the public sphere 
have always formed an important part of the way information networks 
are discussed.27 Indeed, Benkler’s work illustrates two tropes consistently 
associated with writing about the Internet: The first is the understanding 
of the network as essentially distributed and decentralized. The second is 
the assertion that this decentralization leads to a freer form of communi-
cation, liberated from state and other controls. In fact it is really corporate 
control that most concerns Benkler. What open source offers is a form of 
production that maximizes individual freedom in a way that markets and 
firms are unable to. Such a claim is echoed by Tapscott and Williams:
Though it is unlikely that hierarchies will disappear in the 
foreseeable future, a new form of horizontal organization 
is emerging that rivals the hierarchical firm in its capacity 
to create information-based products and services, and in 
some cases, physical things. . . . [T]his new form of organi-
zation is known as peering.28
Although this approach essentially embraces political and economic liber-
alism, there are alternative, more radical visions of decentralization. The-
oretical approaches to networks have long laid claim to a concept of the 
rhizome drawn from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s Mille Plateaux. 
Here the arborescent model of knowledge, vertical and hierarchical, is 
contrasted with the horizontal rhizome: “[U]nlike trees or their roots, the 
rhizome connects any point to any other point,” comment Deleuze and 
Guattari.29 Computer networks and the Web in particular have seemed 
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to many to be an incarnation of the rhizome. Kathleen Burnett argued in 
1993, “Telecommunications systems are rhizomorphic, as are computer 
networks. Think of maps you have seen and descriptions you have heard 
of the internet as rhizome. If we accept the rhizome as a metaphor for 
electronically mediated exchange, then hypertext is its apparent fulfill-
ment.”30 However, there are several difficulties with the appropriation 
of the rhizome to describe computer networks. One problem is that the 
Internet, and the hypertextual Web built on top of it, are perhaps not 
as rhizomatic as Burnett envisaged. Network research by Albert-László 
Barabási and others shows that the evolution of the network demon-
strates the emergence of concentrated clusters and hierarchies of nodes 
within apparently flat networks.31 Does the emergence of hierarchies in 
this manner then undermine the rhizomatic view of the network? On the 
one hand, perhaps no. As Deleuze and Guattari themselves point out in 
Mille Plateaux,
[T]here are knots of arborescence in rhizomes, and rhi-
zomatic offshoots in roots. Moreover, there are despotic 
formations of immanence and channelization specific to 
rhizomes, just as there are anarchic deformations in the 
transcendent system of trees, aerial roots and subterranean 
stems. The important point is that the root-tree and canal-
rhizome are not two opposed models: the first operates as 
a transcendent model and tracing, even if it engenders its 
own escapes; the second operates as an immanent process 
that overturns the model and outlines a map, even if it con-
stitutes its own hierarchies, even if it gives rise to a despotic 
channel.32
However, on the other hand, analyses of the emergent hierarchies within 
distributed networks may problematize some of the liberatory rhetoric 
associated with the network as rhizome. The development of hierarchies 
within online discussion may make us suspicious of the stronger claims 
made about the distributed nature of the Internet leading to an inherently 
more democratic and participatory culture. As Tony Sampson argues, it 
may be better to see the topology of the network as accidental, a mixture 
of controlled and uncontrolled events that “limit the free action of the net-
work, and subsequently reduce the explanatory power of a distinct model 
(including the rhizome) to describe the network experience as a whole.”33
A slightly different approach to this question emerges from Alexan-
der Galloway and Eugene Thacker in The Exploit, who argue that “the 
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liberation rhetoric of distributed networks . . . is a foil for the real work-
ings of power today.”34 They see the distributed, decentralized, or rhizom-
atic aspects of the information network not as inherently disorganized or 
apolitical but as amenable to various systems of control: “[R]hizomatics 
and distribution signal a new management style, a new physics of orga-
nization that is as real as pyramidal hierarchy, corporate bureaucracy . . . 
or any other principle of social and political control.”35 For Galloway 
and Thacker it is important to understand how control functions within 
distributed networks, whether electronic or biological, the “quandary” 
that “no one controls networks, but networks are controlled.”36 Such an 
understanding requires, on their reading, a new “political ontology of 
networks.” Their approach marks a break not only with more liberatory 
approaches to distributed networks but also with some aspects of network 
science.
In particular, Galloway and Thacker take their distance from graph 
theory, which models networks in terms of a set of nodes or vertices and a 
set of edges or lines that connect pairs of vertices. They cite approvingly 
Gilbert Simondon’s argument that we should “understand the individual 
from the perspective of the process of individuation rather than the pro-
cess of individuation by means of the individual.”37 To put this back in 
terms of graph theory, the important thing is to understand the network 
as a process where nodes and edges are individuated rather than under-
standing the network as essentially being composed of nodes and edges. 
Galloway and Thacker trace the concept of individuation to Aristotle and 
gloss it as “what makes a thing what it is.”38 However, it is largely Gilbert 
Simondon’s rethinking of individuation that they have in mind:
In the context of networks, individuation will have to be 
understood differently. Instead of the classical definition, 
in which individuation is always concerned with the pro-
duction of individuals (be they people, political parties, 
or institutions), in the control society, individuation is al-
ways concerned with the individuation of networks as a 
whole and the individuation of the component parts of the 
network.39
The consequence is that, instead of deriving political implications from 
the topology of networks, we see the topology of networks as derived es-
sentially from a process of individuation that is implicitly political.
Such an account demonstrates the limitations of Benkler’s approach to 
understanding peer production in terms of the properties of distributed 
396 BEN ROBERTS
communications networks. By overstating the benefits of decentraliza-
tion, it misses the more complex topological account that Galloway and 
Thacker outline. A further problem with Benkler’s model is that it effec-
tively reduces the political, social, and cultural aspects of peer production 
by focusing on the economic and functional benefits. This is particularly 
apparent in the case of the free software movement, which, as I have in-
dicated earlier, has always had a political and ethical dimension quite 
separate from the pragmatic and processual benefits Benkler prefers to 
focus on. Indeed, the creation of the GNU project (1984) significantly pre-
cedes the widespread adoption of Internet networking, and its founder, 
Richard Stallman, was motivated partly by a desire to defend a kind of 
software-engineering practice that was common in the 1960s and 1970s 
where software source code would be freely circulated by computer sci-
entists on magnetic tape, modifications made, and passed on. This early 
form of peer production therefore predated both the decline in capital 
costs associated with the PC and the fall in communication costs associ-
ated with distributed networks.
A clue to this problem can be found within Benkler’s account of the 
economics of peer production considered earlier in this essay. To recall, 
Benkler cites one of the four conditions of the emergence of peer pro-
duction found in the particular type of labor involved in information 
production:
[T]he primary human input—creative talent—is highly 
variable, more than traditional labor and certainly more 
than many material resources usually central to produc-
tion. Moreover, the individuals who are the “input” possess 
better information than anyone else about the suitability of 
their talents and their level of motivation and focus at given 
moment to given production tasks.40
Benkler points to this condition to highlight peer production’s provision 
of better information about “human capital.”41 (This fits with his general 
argument that the firm, the market, and peer production are really modes 
of information as much as modes of production.) However, the existence 
of this new form of creative labor cannot be reckoned for entirely through 
the organizational advantages of peer production. To understand this 
new mode of production, we might need to consider a fundamental shift 
in the nature of labor, not just a change in the way it is organized. Benk-
ler’s neglect of labor underlines the fundamental weaknesses of his argu-
ment. He sees the development of the network resulting in new forms 
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of nonmarket peer production. But the emergence of creative labor may 
be seen as both preceding the “network information economy” and as 
representing a transformation within market-based capitalist production 
rather than a step beyond it. As Tiziana Terranova puts it,
[T]he conditions that make free labor an important ele-
ment of the digital economy are based in a difficult, ex-
perimental compromise between the historically rooted 
cultural and affective desire for creative production (of the 
kind more commonly associated with Gilroy’s emphasis on 
“individual self-fashioning and communal liberation”) and 
the current capitalist emphasis on knowledge as the main 
source of value-added.42
As Terranova goes on to argue, such labor can be understood as a fun-
damental dimension of postindustrial societies, a form of work that 
Maurizio Lazzarato describes as “immaterial labor.”43 Immaterial labor, 
defined as “the labor that produces the informational and cultural con-
tent of the commodity,”44 is associated by Lazzarato with a transforma-
tion that begins at the start of the 1970s and involves “a transformation of 
working-class labor into a labor of control, of handling information, into 
a decision-making capacity that involves the investment of subjectivity.” 
Such labor may involve “a series of activities not normally recognized as 
“work,” such as “defining and fixing cultural and artistic standards, fash-
ions, tastes, consumer norms, and, more strategically, public opinion.”45 
Immaterial labor is no longer defined by the space of the factory:
The location in which it operates is outside in the society at 
large, at a territorial level that we could call “the basin of 
immaterial labor.” Small and sometimes very small “pro-
ductive units” (often consisting of only one individual) are 
organized for specific ad hoc projects, and may exist only 
for the duration of those particular jobs. The cycle of pro-
duction comes into operation only when it is required by 
the capitalist; once the job has been done, the cycle dissolves 
back into the networks and flows that make possible the 
reproduction and enrichment of its productive capacities.46
Lazzarato’s account of immaterial labor, then, shares with Benkler the as-
sumption of a break with the firm as a mode of organization. However, it 
differs in two distinct fashions. Firstly, as has been suggested, immaterial 
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labor is understood as a change within capitalist market economies rather 
than as the break with the market form or organization, which Benkler as-
cribes to peer production. As the many successful companies that have built 
their business around open source software (such as Red Hat and Google) 
demonstrate, new forms of labor can still be exploited by market-organized 
economies. As David Berry puts it, “[I]t is of crucial importance that the 
FLOSS practices are understood to be taking place within an intensifica-
tion of capitalism rather than signaling its replacement.”47 The second dif-
ference is Lazzarato’s insistence that “immaterial labor constitutes itself in 
forms that are immediately collective,” or, as Terranova puts it, “[k]nowl-
edge labor is inherently collective, it is always the result of a collective and 
social production of knowledge.”48 Benkler’s approach, on the other hand, 
insists on seeing the phenomenon of peer production as essentially the self-
organization of individuals. In many ways, this is a direct result of the liberal 
orientation of his work, one that is made explicit in The Wealth of Networks:
I am offering a liberal political theory, but taking a path 
that has usually been resisted in that literature—consider-
ing economic structure and the limits of the market and 
its supporting institutions from the perspective of freedom, 
rather than accepting the market as it is, and defending 
or criticizing adjustments through the lens of distributive 
justice. . . . [M]y approach heavily emphasizes individual 
action in nonmarket relations. Much of the discussion re-
volves around the choice between markets and nonmarket 
social behavior. . . . [W]hat is special about our moment is 
the rising efficacy of individuals and loose, nonmarket af-
filiations as agents of political economy.49
Indeed, this methodological statement summarizes Benkler’s approach to 
understanding phenomena such as peer production or free software in 
terms of the nonmarket exercise of individual freedom. However, I would 
like to suggest that it may be more productive to see free software as the 
manifestation of neither the “rising efficacy of individuals and loose, non-
market affiliations” nor a new capitalist exploitation of collective immate-
rial labor. Rather, we need to understand the free software movement, as 
Galloway and Thacker suggest in relation to networks, as a new form of 
individuation.
Indeed, I suspect that Benkler is guilty here of, in Simondon’s terms, 
“thinking individuation from the perspective of the individual.” What 
Benkler misses in his analysis is that in free software production the place 
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of the firm does not simply disappear but rather gets replaced by the project, 
the particular piece of software or group of software applications that is 
being worked on. The project may be simply defined by the code itself and 
a loose network of contributors and users of that software. Alternatively it 
may be formally codified and linked to more traditional forms of nonprofit 
organization (such as is the case with the GNOME [GNU Network Object 
Model Environment], Mozilla, and Apache Software foundations).50 But 
in each case the project is substantially more than simply a loose affilia-
tion of individuals, one that usually goes beyond simply the organization 
of production and includes aspects of social and cultural identification. One 
recent contribution to thinking about these types of bond is Christopher 
Kelty’s notion of the “recursive public.”51 Kelty uses recursive to indicate, 
among other things, that “this kind of public includes the activities of mak-
ing, maintaining, and modifying software and networks, as well as the 
more conventional discourse that is thereby enabled.”52 As Kelty argues,
[G]eeks use technology as a kind of argument, for a specific 
kind of order: they argue about technology, but they also 
argue through it. They express ideas, but they also express 
infrastructures through which ideas can be expressed (and 
circulated) in new ways.53
Indeed, Kelty’s arguments around “recursive publics” set out a much 
richer set of relationships among free software developers than the nar-
row economic analysis of peer production is capable of disclosing. Kelty’s 
work suggests the need for a greater focus on the rich and varied nature 
of “hacker culture” and an understanding of free software projects as cul-
tural institutions.54
As Steven Weber argues, the problem with many arguments about 
the effects of reduced communication and transaction costs is that they 
focus only on the destructive changes to traditional business organization, 
ignoring the new structures that have evolved to replace them:
“[S]elf-organization” as a concept by itself can’t fill this gap. 
The Internet does not solve foundational political problems 
of organizing complexity. It does not create working divi-
sions of labor. Reducing or even removing the costs of geo-
graphically widespread and time-dependent collaboration 
is important, but that effort still leaves other collaboration 
costs unsettled—decision making, human emotion, resolu-
tion of technical uncertainties, and so on.55
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Organization structures in FLOSS, Weber suggests, go beyond tradi-
tional models of governance and can be seen at work even in the way the 
code is structured (for example, in the modular design of the Linux ker-
nel) and in the licenses themselves as explicit social structures.
Work such as Kelty’s and Weber’s suggests that free software produc-
tion needs to be rethought not as a liberation of individual knowledge 
creation from the restrictions of the market and the firm but rather as 
the emergence, or individuation, of new forms of collectivity. Such col-
lectivities can be seen as a liberation from the constraints of existing forms 
of social organization but also as the source of new forms of power and 
control. (This parallels the approach taken by Galloway and Thacker in 
their arguments around protocol as “a materialized functioning of dis-
tributed control”.56) For that reason alone, we can’t oppose decentralized 
individualism with an enthusiastic and naïve embrace of collectivism and 
collaboration. Indeed, such a position is arguably the other kind of libera-
tion rhetoric associated with much writing about the Internet.57
What is needed is to understand the individuation of new forms of 
collaborative organization free from simplistic teleological accounts of 
the decentralized individual or network collectivism. Individuation is the 
key concept here, requiring us to think through further the politics of 
individuation in relation to Simondon’s work. As Alberto Toscano has 
argued, what is crucial here is the status of the preindividual, that which 
precedes individuation.58 Toscano finds three types of reading at work in 
responses to Simondon. The first interprets the preindividual as an “unre-
solved charge, carried by the individual as a potential, linking this concept 
to those of human nature and living labor.” Toscano links this to the work 
of Paolo Virno.59 The second sees it as a preexisting commonality between 
the individual and collective, which Muriel Combes calls the “intimacy of 
the common.”60 The third reading that Toscano explores at length is the 
Deleuzian one. Here the preindividual, as that which precedes individua-
tion, is neither a prior collectivity nor a potential but rather a disparate set 
of singularities. As Toscano puts it,
Simondon and Deleuze offer a conception of politics as the 
invention of a communication between initially incompos-
sible series; as invention of a common that is not given in 
advance and which emerges on an ontological background 
of inequality. . . . We are not dealing with the expression 
of a potential but with the invention of a communication 
responding to the larval emergence of divergent energies 
in the social field. The element of politics as analysis and 
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intervention is not the genesis and the concretization of so-
cial relations, but metastability (or disparation) “as such” 
and the event-invention which crystallizes it into a new 
configuration (carrying a further preindividual charge).61
What precedes individuation is therefore not something essentially human 
or a kind of primordial collectivity but rather an unthinkable disparation 
or inequality.62 The preindividual charge understood in this third way 
is not so much a latent force within the social but rather affords insight 
into the essential instability of social relations. Toscano goes on to give 
the example from Simondon’s L’individuation psychique et collective where 
revolutionary change is figured as a breaking of metastability, a deindi-
viduation or disparation at the heart of the metastable group, which then 
leads to the crystallization of a new set of social relations. (Simondon sug-
gests this crystallization can be precipitated by the germ or crystal of the 
revolutionary idea.)63
Toscano’s interpretation of Simondon enables us to understand the free 
software movement as emerging neither from a network of decentralized 
individuals nor as the expression of a latent force of collective labor. The 
free software movement is a symptom of the deindividuation of existing 
types of social relation and relations of production rather than a liberation 
from them, for a liberation invariably implies some force prior to these in-
stitutions (e.g., individual freedom or collective intelligence) that is in the 
process of being unharnessed. Instead, this is a process in which new types 
of individual and collective individuation emerge from the deindividua-
tion of older forms. The most important conclusion that one can draw 
from the arguments about transaction costs is not the economic viability 
of peer production as decentralized individual action but rather that “the 
firm” was never firm but only ever a “metastable” entity. The cultural 
politics of free software need to be understood as the process in which this 
entity dissolves and others crystallize, rather than from the perspective of 
the individual or the collective as a priori.
Such a conclusion underlines the importance of understanding capi-
talist production as an ever-changing and historically specific formation 
rather than a teleological ideal. This is why the neglect of the question of 
labor in Benkler’s account is so telling and so significant. Benkler under-
stands that peer production is possible only because of a change in the 
nature of the product being produced and the type of “creative” labor re-
quired, but places this whole question at the margins of his account, pre-
ferring to emphasize instead transaction costs and intellectual property 
regimes. He is not alone in this neglect of labor. As Andrew Ross points 
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out, it is one of the hallmarks of much recent critical work on questions 
of intellectual property and commons production.64 But labor is the cru-
cial pivot that links the questions raised by free and open source software 
production to wider social and cultural formations, rather than a narrow 
technological idealism of “the network.” The emergence of free and open 
source software is in many ways a surprising, unpredictable development 
and not an inevitable outcome of technological change or decentraliza-
tion. In understanding this development, we need to place less emphasis 
on the forces of technological or economic necessity and more on its con-
tingent foundations.
Ben Roberts is lecturer in media studies at the University of Bradford. He is currently editing a 
special issue of the journal New Formations on the work of Bernard Stiegler.
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